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Executive summary 
The sustainment costs of military aircraft constitute a substantial 
part of the total life cycle costs, which implies that the application 
of innovative methods and technologies in the sustainment 
process may lead to large cost savings. An important trend in this 
respect is the transition from preventative maintenance to 
Condition Based Maintenance (CBM). For CBM it is essential that 
the actual system condition can be measured and that the 
measured condition can be reliably extrapolated to a convenient 
moment in the future in order to facilitate the planning process 
while maintaining flight safety. Much research effort is currently 
being put in the development of technologies that enable CBM, 
 
 
 
Fielding a Structural Health Monitoring system on legacy military aircraft 
A business perspective 
UNCLASSIFIED 
 
National Aerospace Laboratory NLR 
Anthony Fokkerweg 2, 1059 CM Amsterdam, 
P.O. Box 90502, 1006 BM Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
Telephone +31 (0)88 511 31 13, Fax +31 (0)88 511 32 10, Website: www.nlr.nl UNCLASSIFIED 
 
among which Structural Health Monitoring (SHM) systems. Good 
progress has already been booked when it comes to sensors, 
sensor networks, data acquisition, models and algorithms, data 
fusion/mining techniques, etc. However, the transition of these 
technologies into service is very slow. Reasons are that business 
cases are difficult to define and that certification of SHM systems 
is very challenging. 
This paper describes a possibility for fielding a SHM system on 
legacy military aircraft with a minimum amount of certification 
issues and with a good prospect of a positive return on 
investment. For appropriate areas in the airframe the application 
of SHM will reconcile the fail-safety and slow crack growth 
damage tolerance approaches that can be used for safeguarding 
the continuing airworthiness of these areas, combining the 
benefits of both approaches and removing the drawbacks 
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Summary 
The transition of Structural Health Monitoring (SHM) technologies into service is 
very slow. Reasons are that business cases are difficult to define and that 
certification of SHM systems is very challenging. 
This paper describes a possibility for fielding a SHM system on legacy military aircraft with a 
minimum amount of certification issues and with a good prospect of a positive return on 
investment. 
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Abbreviations 
Acronym Description 
ac Critical fatigue crack size 
ad Detectable fatigue crack size 
ai Initial fatigue crack size 
ASIP Aircraft Structural Integrity Program 
CBM Condition Based Maintenance 
CVM Comparative Vacuum Monitoring 
DLL Design Limit Load 
FS Fuselage Station 
NDI Non-Destructive Inspection 
NLR National Aerospace Laboratory 
POD Probability Of Detection 
SHM Structural Health Monitoring 
SOF Safety Of Flight 
Tc Time of failure 
Ti Time of initial inspection 
TRL Technology Readiness Level 
USAF United States Air Force 
Tr Recurring inspection interval 
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1 Introduction 
Military operators worldwide are looking for ways and means to maintain or even improve the 
availability and continuing airworthiness of their fleets of aircraft while decreasing the cost of 
ownership. The sustainment costs of military aircraft constitute a substantial part of the total life 
cycle costs (typically in the order of two-thirds), which implies that the application of innovative 
methods and technologies in the sustainment process may lead to large cost savings. An 
important trend in this respect, especially within the USAF, US Navy and US Army but also within 
the aerospace industry, is the transition from preventative maintenance – based on calendar 
time, flight hours or flight cycles – to Condition Based Maintenance (CBM). Maintenance is then 
only performed when needed, which is expected to lead to a significant cost reduction. For CBM 
it is essential that the actual system condition can be measured (diagnostics) and that the 
measured condition can be reliably extrapolated (prognostics) to a convenient moment in the 
future in order to facilitate the planning process while maintaining flight safety. Much research 
effort is currently being put in the development of technologies that enable CBM, among which 
Structural Health Monitoring (SHM) systems. Good progress has already been booked when it 
comes to sensors, sensor networks, data acquisition, models and algorithms, data fusion/mining 
techniques, etc. However, the transition of these technologies into service is very slow. There are 
two reasons for this: 
 Business Cases are difficult to define since CBM represents a disruptive technology that 
produces a paradigm shift for maintenance support [1]; 
 Certification is difficult as the validation of the SHM system’s capability to reliably and 
accurately detect impending in-service failures is extremely challenging; in addition, the 
procedures for obtaining maintenance credits are still being developed. 
 
One option to validate the performance of a particular SHM system is to use a seeded fault test. 
This requires a hi-fidelity and expensive test bench and a good a priori knowledge of the location 
and the nature of the failure modes that are to be detected. An alternative is to field the SHM 
system in a sufficient number of aircraft and evaluate its performance after a sufficient number 
of flight cycles. ‘Sufficient’ in this respect is indeterminate and may cover a significant part of the 
service life in order to be able to collect relevant data. This, of course, is undesirable. Fortunately 
there are some special cases where certification of a SHM system for use in military aircraft is 
much easier. This paper describes such a case. It forms an opportunity to field a SHM system on 
legacy military aircraft such as the F-16 with a minimum amount of certification issues and with a 
good prospect of a positive return on investment. Seizing it would be an evolutionary step 
towards more challenging applications. 
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2 Structural integrity concepts of military 
aircraft 
The formation and growth of fatigue cracks is still considered to be the major threat to the 
structural safety and continuing airworthiness of military combat and transport aircraft [2]. To 
guard against the detrimental effects of structural fatigue, a number of design and maintenance 
concepts have been evolved over the years. Two philosophies are currently in use, viz. the safe 
life concept, which precludes the presence of fatigue cracks, and the damage tolerance concept, 
in which fatigue cracks and other flaws that are assumed to be present from day one should not 
grow to a critical size within a reasonable period (e.g. lifetime or inspection interval), in order to 
allow for timely detection and repair. The initial USAF damage tolerance requirements were 
introduced in 1974, in MIL-A-83444 [3], and the F-16 is the first fighter aircraft that has been 
designed and certified to this specification. MIL-A-83444 allowed the use of either fail-safe or 
slow crack growth design concepts. The focus for the F-16 and other contemporary fighters was 
on slow crack growth however, since most combat aircraft were designed with many single load 
path structures and in its original form the MIL-A-83444 requirements tended to discourage the 
application of fail-safety [4]. With the slow crack growth concept it is mandatory that material, 
manufacturing and/or service induced defects not be allowed to grow to their critical crack sizes 
before they are detected and repaired. The slow crack growth damage tolerance concept 
therefore only provides safety if it incorporates a rigorous inspection program. Conservative 
initial crack sizes were specified in MIL-A-83444  and later in the Joint Services Specification 
Guide, JSSG-2006 [5], and Structures Bulletin EN-SB-08-002 [6]  for use in design and in 
establishing inspection requirements. A typical value is 1.27 mm (or 0.05”) for a corner crack that 
is to represent a flaw (i.e. manufacturing defect, material defect, corrosion pit, maintenance 
induced damage, etc.) that is assumed to be present at the most critical location (e.g. a fastener 
hole) in a flight critical structural item. The required time Ti for the initial inspection is then 
determined by dividing the time that it takes for a fatigue crack to grow from its initial size a i to 
its critical size ac by a safety or scatter factor of two, where ac is the crack size at which design 
limit load (DLL) will lead to unstable fracture. This is schematically shown in Figure 1. This figure 
also shows how the recurring inspection interval Tr is determined. The recurring inspection 
interval is generally shorter than the time to initial inspection since it is based on the safe crack 
growth life of an in-service detectable flaw with size ad, which depends on the inspection method 
that is used (visual, eddy current, etc.), the location in the aircraft (easy access or not, lighting 
conditions), the presence of fastener heads that block the view on the crack, etc. The minimum 
detectable flaw sizes used in the establishment of the recurring inspection intervals should be 
based on experimentally determined probability of detection (POD) curves that are relevant for 
  
   NLR-TP-2014-296 | 9 
 
the selected inspection method and the material and geometry of the structural area that is to be 
inspected. Guidelines are provided in USAF Structures Bulletin EN-SB-08-012 [7]. 
 
 
Figure 1:  Determination of the initial inspection time Ti (in green) and the recurring inspection interval Tr 
(in blue) in the slow crack growth damage tolerance concept. 
 
Fatigue crack growth curves are determined with fracture mechanics models that are calibrated 
against the results from fatigue tests on coupons, components and/or full-scale structures. 
 
It should be realized that the initial flaw with size ai that is assumed to exist at T=0 is entirely 
fictitious. This conservative approach provides safety against a multitude of potential threats 
such as material imperfections, manufacturing problems, maintenance induced damage, etc. 
Actual cracks are therefore rarely found during the inspections, especially during the ones 
scheduled early in the service life of the aircraft, as illustrated in Figure 2. This notion has led to 
the relatively recent development of using risk-based methods to establish maintenance 
requirements. The advantage of using probabilistic methods is that they can be fed with service 
findings and that any factor that affects safety of flight can be included in the analysis, such as 
the probability of missing an inspection, the increasing probability of the formation of fatigue 
cracks with time and the variability of material parameters, initial flaw sizes, service loads, usage, 
etc. A description of these methods is beyond the scope of the present paper, however, but an 
introduction can be found in ref. [8]. 
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Figure 2:  In-service inspections for fatigue cracks. After each inspection the size of the assumed analytical 
crack is reset to its in-service detectable size ad. 
 
Be that as it may, the USAF have recently revised the original MIL-A-83444 fail-safe requirements 
in an attempt to encourage fail-safe design and certification of future military aircraft as well as 
provide the basis for fail-safe assessments of legacy aircraft. Although no military aircraft has 
been designed and certified to the MIL-A-83444 fail-safe requirements, most of these aircraft do 
feature some fail-safety through the use of multiple redundant load paths. In a fail-safe structure 
a primary component is allowed to completely or partially fail, provided that the residual 
strength of the adjacent secondary structural elements is sufficient to sustain critical design limit 
load conditions and that the failure of the primary load path is either readily detectable during a 
scheduled visual inspection (so not NDI) or malfunction evident, meaning a failure would result in 
the malfunction of other systems (e.g. fuel leakage or pressure loss) that would alert the flight or 
ground personnel to the existence of the failure. “Readily detectable” could also mean that the 
failure is apparent from in-flight or post flight visual observations. The new fail-safe requirements 
are laid down in Structures Bulletin EN-SB-08-001 [9]. Some of the MIL-A-83444 requirements 
that discouraged the application of fail-safety, such as the stipulation of dependent load paths 
[4], have been removed and also the definition of the fail-safety life limit has been revised and in 
general the life limit is now longer than the one defined in MIL-A-83444. 
 
There were a number of reasons to promote fail-safety and revise the criteria: 
 Fail-safety provides protection against all forms of damage an aircraft may encounter in 
its lifetime (incl. battle damage and discrete source damage due to bird strike, 
uncontained engine disk failures, etc.) instead of fatigue damage only. 
 The minimum in-service detectable flaw sizes as specified in USAF Structures Bulletin 
EN-SB-08-012 issued in 2013 are generally larger than what was assumed previously. For 
legacy aircraft such as the F-16, that has many structural areas with small critical crack 
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sizes, this has led to revised recurring inspection intervals for slow crack growth damage 
tolerant structure which, in some cases, were unacceptably short or even zero. 
 Fail-safe damage tolerance structure only needs to be inspected visually, which entails a 
very limited maintenance burden. Identification of those safety-of-flight (SOF) locations 
which have inherent fail-safe capability, and classifying these locations as such, will 
allow relaxation of the current inspection burden by focusing special non-destructive 
inspections (NDI) on only those SOF locations which are not fail-safe. This will entail 
significant cost reductions and it will lead to an increase of aircraft safety, availability 
and readiness, especially for aging fleets. 
 NDI often requires the removal of sealant and/or fasteners. By doing so damage may 
inadvertently be inflicted to the SOF locations in question. Scratches and dents are often 
the precursors to fatigue cracks. Fail-safe damage tolerance structure only needs to be 
inspected visually, with less associated risk of inflicting damage to critical structure. 
 
Fail-safety can also assist when areas are inaccessible or not practical to inspect regularly [10]. An 
example is provided in Figure 3, which shows the F-16 fuel shelf of which the joint bolt holes in 
the upper wing carry-through bulkhead at fuselage station FS 341 are fracture critical.  
 
  
Figure 3:  Difficult access to the fracture critical F-16 fuel shelf joint bolt holes at FS341 (left). Visual 
inspection for large cracks in flanges and web of the upper bulkhead is much easier (right) [10]. 
 
When managed using slow crack growth damage tolerance, the joint bolts need to be removed 
during depot level maintenance to enable the bolt hole eddy current inspection that is required 
for the detection of small cracks. This is very difficult and often damage is induced. Managing this 
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area using fail-safety and visual inspection for fuel leaks or for large cracks in the flanges or webs 
of the upper bulkhead is much easier and does not require specialized technicians and tools. 
 
For this particular case it has been shown by the aircraft manufacturer that if the lower flange 
and web at the fuel shelf joint bolt hole of the upper FS 341 bulkhead fail, limit load can indeed 
be carried by the adjacent bulkheads and wing attachment fittings [11], which is a prerequisite 
for fail-safety. Another requirement for fail-safety is that wide-spread fatigue in the form of 
multi-element damage should be precluded. This means that there is a fail-safety life limit. This 
limit is determined by the fatigue or durability life of the secondary structural elements, which is 
the life of a very small fatigue crack – representative of normal production quality or ‘fatigue 
quality’, typically sized at 0.25 mm [9] – to failure. This is explained in Figure 4. Once the fail-
safety life limit is reached, the probability of secondary structural elements failing in fatigue 
becomes very high and fail-safety can no longer be guaranteed. Inspections should then again be 
based on slow crack growth damage tolerance criteria. 
 
 
Figure 4:  Determination of the fail-safety life limit from the crack growth curve for adjacent structure [9]. 
The visual inspection interval usually is aligned with phased maintenance. The initial inspection is 
not prescribed in ref. [9], but is usually taken as half the safe period of unrepaired usage. 
 
It should be noted that damage tolerance, irrespective whether it is based on slow crack growth 
or fail-safety, provides safety against incidental cracks that may occur during the service life. 
When the fatigue life of the structure expires, the formation of widespread fatigue damage is to 
be expected. In this condition, damage tolerant design concepts become ineffective and the 
structure should be retired. 
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3 Potential SHM business case 
Managing the continuing airworthiness of a fracture critical structural item with fail-safety 
damage tolerance can be an effective means of mitigating the inspection burden and, as 
explained in the previous section, has the potential of saving money, decreasing aircraft 
downtime and increasing safety and fleet readiness. In legacy aircraft such as the F-16 many 
structural areas could probably be re-classified as fail-safe structure due to their inherent 
redundancy in load paths. Therefore, by implementing the new fail-safe criteria, this structure 
would no longer require a special NDI per slow crack growth damage tolerance criteria, but only 
require visual inspections for large failures. There is one significant disadvantage to this, 
however: upon detection of cracks their sizes will be such that simple repairs will not be possible 
anymore. Small fatigue damage at fastener holes can be repaired by reaming the hole and 
installing a bushing or oversize fastener. Other cases of small fatigue or corrosion damage can 
often be blended away or cut out and reinforced with a strap or angle. Completely failed load 
paths, however, usually entail a costly and lengthy repair and may even involve the replacement 
of an entire wing spar, bulkhead, skin or longeron. This is why many F-16 and other military 
aircraft operators are hesitant about switching from the NDI-based slow crack growth 
maintenance approach (with the potential of detecting small repairable cracks) to fail-safety that 
relies on frequent visual inspections. 
 
This dilemma of having to choose between slow crack growth, to avoid the risk of expensive 
repairs, and fail-safety, to avoid cumbersome inspections, can be resolved by the application of 
SHM technology. Normally it would require an extensive and very challenging validation and 
certification process to replace a mandated and well-established NDI inspection by an automated 
inspection with a SHM system. This is an important barrier for implementing SHM technology in 
an operational fleet of aircraft. However, in the case of fail-safety managed airframe structure, it 
is conceivable to install SHM sensors at the primary structural load path without relying on them 
for safety. The SHM system is then used for economic reasons only, to detect cracks in the 
primary structural area while they are still small and easy to repair. In case the SHM system fails 
to do so, safety is not jeopardized since the continuing airworthiness of the aircraft is still 
managed by means of fail-safety with visual inspections for large cracks. This means that 
certification of the SHM system will not be much of an issue, whereas the business case of 
potentially avoiding large and expensive repairs without the need for cumbersome NDI may be 
sufficiently worthwhile to justify the upfront investments in the development and installation of 
a suitable SHM system. 
 
 
 
 
Fielding a Structural Health Monitoring system on legacy military aircraft 
A business perspective 
  
 
14 | NLR-TP-2014-296   
 
This approach can also be taken to increase the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) of the currently 
available SHM technology, by testing it on flying aircraft (instead of in a laboratory environment 
only) without compromising the safety or disrupting the maintenance process of the fleet. The 
financial side of the business case is less important then and the outlook of over-the-horizon 
benefits could justify the investments and convince a military aircraft operator to participate in 
such a development program. What needs to be done is finding suitable structural aircraft 
elements that can be classified as fail-safe structure due to their inherent redundancy in load 
paths, and develop appropriate SHM solutions for monitoring these items. An example described 
in ref. [10] is the F-16 wing root rib, which contains a number of manifold holes that are fatigue 
critical. Eddy current inspection requires the removal of the wing, which is very labour intensive. 
Visual inspection for fuel leaks is much easier but will only permit the detection of large difficult-
to-repair cracks. Another example was already provided in Figure 3 (which pertains to a difficult-
to-repair wing carry-through bulkhead) but, at least for the F-16, there are a number of other 
airframe components that would qualify for this purpose. 
 
Examples of potentially suitable SHM technology for the detection of small cracks are the 
comparative vacuum monitoring (CVM) system from SMS plc [12,13] or the permanently-
mounted conformable eddy-current sensors such as those developed by Jentek [14] or DSTO 
[15]. This is not further elaborated here, as the present paper mainly serves to point out the 
possibility of demonstrating or even qualifying the capability of a SHM system on an operational 
fleet of aircraft without the need for a rigorous certification process but with a tangible benefit. 
 
4 Conclusion 
The application of SHM technology will potentially reduce the sustainment costs of new and 
existing military aircraft. The transition of the currently available technologies into service is very 
slow, however. This is mainly caused by the very challenging process to validate any SHM 
system’s capability to reliably and accurately detect impending in-service failures, and the 
difficulty in defining attractive business cases. The present paper describes the possibility to field 
a SHM system on legacy military aircraft such as the F-16 with a minimum amount of certification 
issues and with a good prospect of a positive return on investment. For appropriate areas in the 
airframe the application of SHM will reconcile the fail-safety and slow crack growth damage 
tolerance approaches that can be used for safeguarding the continuing airworthiness of these 
areas, combining the benefits of both approaches and removing the drawbacks.  
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    The SHM business case can be summarized as: 
          •  fly it... 
          •  ...but do not have to rely on it (safety)... 
          •  ...while still benefiting from it ($$$)! 
 
 
Demonstrating SHM technology on flying aircraft will increase the TRL of the demonstrated 
technology and the confidence in its reliability and use needed for any military aircraft operator 
to accept it. Seizing this opportunity would be an evolutionary step towards more challenging 
applications. The author hopes that the present paper will give an impetus to the SHM 
community to do so. 
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W H A T  I S  N L R ?  
 
The  NLR  i s  a  D utc h o rg an i s at io n th at  i de n t i f i es ,  d ev e lop s  a n d a p pl i es  h i gh -t ech  know l ed g e i n  t he  
aero s pac e sec tor .  Th e NLR ’s  ac t i v i t i es  ar e  soc ia l ly  r e lev an t ,  m ar ke t -or i en ta te d ,  an d co n d uct ed  
not- for - p rof i t .  I n  t h i s ,  th e  NLR  s erv e s  to  bo ls te r  th e gove r nm en t ’s  i n nova t iv e  c apa b i l i t ie s ,  w h i l e  
a lso  p romot i ng  t he  i n nova t iv e  a n d com p et i t iv e  ca pa c i t ie s  o f  i t s  p ar tn er  com pa ni e s .  
 
The NLR,  renowned for its leading expert ise,  professional  approach and independent consultancy,  is  
staffed by c l ient-orientated personnel who are not only highly ski l led and educated,  but also 
continuously strive to develop and improve their  competencies. The NLR moreover possesses an 
impressive array of  high qual ity research faci l i t ies.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
